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Abstract
We consider sequential competition among sellers, with different consumers desir-
ing the good at different times. Each consumer could buy from a later seller. Each seller
recognizes that future sellers are potential competitors, and therefore does not neces-
sarily set his monopoly price, which is the price he would set if consumers could only
buy from the ﬁrst seller they encounter. We show, however, that whether an equilibrium
price is indeed lower than the monopoly price of each seller depends on the form of con-
sumers’ impatience. With time discounting, this is so. But when impatience reﬂects de-
creasingvaluations, theequilibriumpricemay(and, incertaincases,must)coincidewith
the sellers’ monopoly prices, which means that their market power is not diminished by
competition with future sellers. Even in this case, however, prices below the monopoly
price may exist if sellers are aware of the history of sales and may react to previous price
changes.
JEL Classiﬁcations C73, D91, L13
KeywordsSequentialcompetition,Imperfectmarkets,Intertemporalconsumerchoice
1 Introduction
Firms or sellers that are alone in a particular market at a particular time have greater market
power than they would in the presence of close competitors. This market power, however,
may be constrained when consumers believe that future competitors will offer the good at
a lower price and so defer buying it.1 In this respect, competition between present and fu-
ture sellers resembles that between producers of partially substitutable products. However,
temporal separation between physically identical goods differs from product differentiation
along other dimensions in several important ways. For example, if the current seller is later
replaced by another seller, then a consumer who chooses not to buy from the current seller
cannot later reverse himself even if the price set by a later seller turns out to be higher than
he expected. In addition, that price may be affected by the demand that the later seller faces,
which in turn depends on the number of consumers who deferred buying the good. More-
over, sequentialcompetitionofteninvolvesuncertainty—boththecurrentsellerandthecur-
rent consumers may be uncertain about when the good will again be on the market.2 Thus
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1Zeithammer (2006) gives evidence that consumers’ decisions are affected by expectations of future sales of a
good. He ﬁnds that consumers on eBay bidding in a current auction and expecting a future auction for a similar
good reduce their bids.
2The appearance of sellers at uncertain times can apply when supply depends on the vagaries of nature. An
historically important example relates to sailing ships, which were subject to the whim of the winds, making the
length of a voyage over a given route uncertain, and so creating much uncertainty about when the next ship will
be in port and be available for another sea voyage (Marvin, 1902). For another example, given the risks of rockets
failing or of the space shuttle needing repair, a ﬁrm wishing to launch a satellite is unsure about the times at
which it would be able to launch.
1sequential competition creates unique strategic interdependencies between sellers and con-
sumers, and also involves issues of information and beliefs that do not always arise for other
forms of competition.
AsDiamond(1971)demonstrated,competingidenticalﬁrmsmayenjoyeffectivemonopoly
power if each consumer bears an arbitrarily small cost in switchingfrom one ﬁrm to another.
This is because the switching cost makes consumers buy from a ﬁrm at a price that leaves
them positive utility even if it is slightly higher than the competitors’ price. Hence, each ﬁrm
can raise his price slightly above what other ﬁrms charge, and will do so as long as the others
charge less than the monopoly price.
The analog of a ﬁrm’s monopoly price in our case of sequential competition is the price
it would set if every consumer could only buy from the ﬁrst seller he encounters. Switching
costs correspond to the loss of utility due to the waiting time to the next seller, which rep-
resents the consumers’ impatience. It turns out, however, that whether these costs indeed
result in the sellers enjoying complete monopoly power depends on the exact nature of the
consumers’impatience. Iftheconsumers’impatiencereﬂectsdecliningvaluations,meaning
that the item’s value to them is actually lower the later it is purchased,3 then Diamond’s con-
clusion essentially holds: a common monopoly price for the sellers can be an equilibrium
price. However, if consumers simply discount the future, then an equilibrium price will gen-
erally be lower than the monopoly price. These two forms of impatience are not equivalent.
With time discounting, a consumer prefers buying the good sooner rather than later, but the
maximum price he is willing to pay is the same in both cases. Declining valuation, by con-
trast, means that the maximum price depends on the time of the transaction. As we show
in this article, this difference has a dramatic effect on the equilibrium prices and thus on the
sellers’ gain from the absence of contemporary competitors.
Another important determinant of the effect of competition on the sellers’ market power
is the information they have about the history of sales or the current market conditions. If
the sellers are completely uninformed and the consumers have declining valuations, a com-
mon monopoly price is the only possible equilibrium price. But in the more realistic case
of informed sellers, who in particular know if their predecessor raised the price and conse-
quently lostsome of hiscustomers, lower equilibrium prices mayalso exist. Thus, somewhat
paradoxically, sellers may suffer from being better informed.
Information about the history of sales may harm sellers because it adds credibility to a
threat by consumers not to buy at a price higher than some speciﬁed maximum. The threat
is implicit in the following strategy. If a seller sets a high price, then some of the consumers
who would get positive utility from buying the good choose not to buy it. Their number,
which is determined by the strategy, induces the next seller to lower the price precisely to the
point which equalizes the payoff of the consumers who did and did not buy from the ﬁrst
seller. Hence, no consumer is harmed by following the strategy. Thus, the credibility of the
consumers’ threat depends on the next seller’s ability to react optimally to his predecessor’s
price, and in particular to set a lower price if old consumers, with relatively low valuations of
the good, are sufﬁciently numerous.
Related literature
Models of dynamic competition have yielded two extreme, opposing, results. When a buyer
faces a cost of searching for a seller, each seller may be able to charge the monopoly price,
as if there were no other sellers (Diamond, 1971). At the other extreme, if the monopolist
sells the good in later periods, it creates its own competition, and with rational expectations
by buyers the price will be the same as under perfect competition (Coase, 1972). The rea-
soning is that after selling the good at some price, the ﬁrm faces a new demand curve from
3For example, a parent may value a crib more just before a baby’s birth than months afterward, when she
needs it for little more time.
2remaining consumers. The ﬁrm will want to sell to them, at a lower price, and the process
continuesuntil eachconsumerbuys thegood. The initialconsumers, realizing thattheseller
has such incentives, would then be willing to wait, to buy at the lower price. Much of the
work considering dynamic competition has a consumer buying one unit of the good (as we
do) and a seller selling only one unit (whereas we have elastic supply by the seller). Thus
Said (2011) considers sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers and sellers. A key
result is that the seller will almost surely trade with the ﬁrst buyer at a price close to the low-
est possible valuation. Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) study a ﬁrst-price auction with a
reservation price. A buyer or seller who fails to trade remains in the market, is rematched in
the next period, and tries again to trade. We, in contrast, have the seller post a price, and new
sellers appear in future periods. Bargaining, rather than auctions, with the appearance of
new buyers or sellers, is modelled by Taylor (1995), Inderst (2008), and Fuchs and Skrzypacz
(2010).
Dynamic considerations appear in Fudenberg et al. (1987), who model a seller of an indi-
visible good. They have the seller uncertain about the buyer’s valuation, and becoming more
pessimistic over time. Multiple equilibria can appear, because of an externality between the
different buyers: if future buyers are likely to accept high prices, the seller is likely to switch
buyers, and thus the current buyer should also accept a high price. The opposite holds if
future buyers are expected to reject a high price. This general idea also appears in our arti-
cle, but for a different reason—if buyers with declining valuations do not buy now, the future
price a proﬁt-maximizing seller will post will be low.
Theassumptionofdecliningvaluationforagoodrelatestoworkontransportation,where
each consumer valuation of a trip depends on when it is provided. In particular, work on
schedule delay in airlines (see Douglas and Miller, 1974, and Devany, 1975) considers con-
sumerswhowanttodepartataparticulartime, andarewillingtopaylessforanairlineticket
whentheﬂightisearlierorlaterthanthemostpreferreddeparturetime. Anairline,recogniz-
ing such behavior, then realizes that it can charge a higher price the more frequent the ﬂights
it offers, so that the schedule delay is small. Related ideas appear in the bottleneck model of
commuting to work, where each person has a desired time of arriving to work, incurring a
cost if he arrives too early or too late (Vickrey, 1969, and Arnott et al., 1993).
2 The Model
Constructing a tractable model of sequential competition requires making some assump-
tions. In our model, a consumer buys one or no unit of a particular good, and sellers have
an unlimited supply of it. This rules out, for example, auctions in which sellers only own a
single unit. Both sides of the market stay there only for a short time: a mere instant for the
sellers, who therefore do not overlap, and a ﬁxed, ﬁnite period for the buyers, which we take
as the unit of time. The time axis extends from ￿1 to 1. The origin, t = 0, has no special
meaning.
Consumers arrive at the market in a steady ﬂow. The total mass, or “number”, of con-
sumers that arrive in a unit of time is taken as the unit of mass. Sellers arrive one at a time.
We model their arrival as a simple point process T on the time axis (Daley and Vere-Jones,
1988). A realization of the process is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite collection of distinct points, which
representthesellers’arrivaltimes. Thisexcludessimultaneousarrivalsofsellersbutincludes
deterministic arrival times and, in particular, arrival at regular intervals. Other special cases
of our model are a predetermined number of sellers with random arrival times, and arrival
only on positive t’s. In general, however, both the sellers’ arrival times and their number may
be uncertain, and a ﬁrst and a last seller may or may not exist. To exclude certain artiﬁcial,
unreasonable cases, we assume that the total number of sellers arriving in any ﬁnite time
interval has a ﬁnite expectation (which deﬁnes the so-called mean measure of the process
3T) and that the probability of very short inter-arrival times is small. Speciﬁcally, the latter
means that for every ￿ < 1 there is ￿ > 0 such that, at every time t at which a seller arrives
and for all possible histories of previous arrivals, the (conditional) probability that the wait-
ing time to the next seller is greater than ￿ (or that no more sellers arrive) is greater than ￿.
We also assume that there is non-zero probability that some seller arrives less than one unit
of time after the previous one. This assumption excludes the uninteresting case in which no
seller ever competes with another.
A consumer enters the market, or is “born”, at a certain time c and leaves it when he buys
the good or at time c + 1;whichever comes ﬁrst. At every moment, each consumer has a
certain valuation of the good, 0 ￿ v ￿ 1, which is the maximum price he may be willing
to pay for it. The consumer’s payoff from buying at any price 0 ￿ p ￿ v is v ￿ p, and if
he never buys the good, the payoff is zero. For any admissible price, the consumer would
prefer buying the good right away rather than later. We consider two alternative sources for
this impatience: declining valuations and time discounting. In the ﬁrst model, the value v
that a consumer assigns to the good decreases has his “age” x, or the time the consumer
has been in the market, increases. We model this dependence by setting v = 1 ￿ x. In the
second model, a consumer’s valuation v is ﬁxed throughout his lifetime. Because this means
that we cannot rely on age differences to create demand heterogeneity, we assume that the
consumers’ valuations are varied already at birth, speciﬁcally, that v is uniformly distributed
between0and1. Theconsumers’(identical)timepreferencestaketheformofanexponential
discount function e￿￿t, where ￿ is the (common) discount rate. At any time t, the payoff a
consumer with valuation v attaches to buying the good at price 0 ￿ p ￿ v at a later time t+￿
is e￿￿￿(v ￿ p).
An arriving seller sets and announces a price 0 ￿ p ￿ 1 for a unit of the good, sells the de-
manded quantity, which he produces at zero cost, and then immediately leaves the market.
His payoff is the proﬁt from selling the good, which equals the revenue.
Information and strategies
Withsequentialcompetition, thesellers’andbuyers’possiblestrategiesdependontheinfor-
mation they have. To simplify the analysis, this article considers only the two extreme cases
of sellers with either perfect information about the history of prior sales or no information
at all. Information or lack thereof turns out to greatly affect the sellers’ market power, so al-
lowing only one of these possibilities would be overly restrictive. In both cases, we suppose
buyers are perfectly informed about the past.
The(possible)randomnessofthesellers’arrivalsmakesourmodelavariantofarandom-
player game (Milchtaich, 2004). In such a game, strategies are ascribed not to individual
agents but to agent types.
A seller’s type is his arrival time t. A strategy for type t is a rule that assigns an asking price
0 ￿ p ￿ 1 to each possible history at time t. Such a history Ht is a complete description
of all relevant past events: the arrival times of the previous sellers, the prices they set, and
the total mass and age distribution of the consumers who bought the good from them. A
strategy is feasible for a seller if it depends on information about the history that the seller
actually has. Hence, the better informed are sellers about the past, the larger are their sets
of feasible strategies. When sellers are (perfectly) informed, their feasible strategies are all
the strategies of their respective types. With (completely) uninformed sellers, the feasible
strategies for each type of seller are simply speciﬁcations of an asking price 0 ￿ p ￿ 1. Other
possibilities are that some sellers are informed and some are uninformed, or that sellers are
only partially informed, for example, informed about the previous sellers’ asking prices but
not about the consumers’ reaction to them. For tractability, however, we consider only the
two extreme cases described above.
4Each seller has (posterior) beliefs about the other sellers’ arrival times. Even for an unin-
formed seller, these beliefs are not necessarily identical to those derived from the common
prior, which is the distribution of the point process T. The difference arises because an un-
informed seller who arrives at time t knows something that was not necessarily known in ad-
vance, namely, that a seller arrived at time t. This information may give an indication about
the other arrival times. If the seller is uninformed, no additional information is available to
him, so that his posterior about the arrival times is the conditional distribution of T, given
that a seller arrived at time t. This conditional distribution is called the Palm distribution
(Kallenberg, 1986). For an informed seller, the posterior is obtained by further conditioning
the Palm distribution on the actual arrival times of the previous sellers, that is, by taking into
consideration both the seller’s own arrival time and the history. For both kinds of sellers,
the posterior induces a distribution for each variable that can be expressed as a function of
(some or all of) the arrival times, such as the total number of sellers, the time ￿ from the last
seller’s appearance, and the waiting time ￿ to the next seller (with ￿ or ￿ deﬁned as 1 if there
are no earlier or later sellers, respectively). If the (posterior) distribution is degenerate, that
is, if it assigns probability 1 to a particular value, then we say that the seller knows the vari-
able. For example, an informed seller by deﬁnition knows ￿, whereas an uninformed seller
may or may not know it. Note that, regardless of whether or not sellers are informed, the
probability that they all know that ￿ ￿ 1 is less than 1. This is because, by assumption, the
(prior) probability that the sellers’ arrivals are all at least one unit of time apart is zero.
A consumer’s type is speciﬁed by his time of birth c and his valuation of the good at that
time (which determines the valuation at any later time). A strategy for a consumer of type
c is a rule that assigns either the decision Buy or Wait to each buying opportunity he may
encounter. A buying opportunity is speciﬁed by the arrival time t of the seller (with c ￿ t ￿
c + 1), the posted price 0 ￿ p ￿ 1 and the history Ht. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that all consumers are informed, that is, they know the history, so that all the strategies of
their respective types are feasible. This assumption entails that whenever a seller arrives at
the market, all the consumers have identical posterior beliefs about the future arrival times,
which coincide with those of the arriving seller if he is also informed.
The information, beliefs and strategies of the sellers and consumers together determine
each agent’s expectation at each moment regarding his gain from unilaterally switching to
any feasible strategy different from that speciﬁed for his type. For an uninformed agent,
“unilateral” means that all the other agents’ actions accord with their strategies. For an in-
formed agent, the meaning is similar, but only concerning future actions; the history may or
may not be consistent with the strategy proﬁle. If the expected gain is positive, the devia-
tion is proﬁtable for the agent. A strategy proﬁle is a (Bayesian perfect) equilibrium if prof-
itable deviations do not exist. Note that this requirement concerns also histories that are not
consistent with the strategy proﬁle, which means that it excludes irrational off-equilibrium
behavior by informed agents.
3 Monopoly Prices
Our main concern in this article is the effect of competition from future sellers on the sellers’
market power. Competition has no effect if the prices sellers set and the proﬁts they earn are
the same as they would be if each consumer could only buy from the ﬁrst seller he encoun-
ters, in other words, if sellers had complete monopoly power.
A seller may face both young consumers, who were born after the previous seller ap-
peared and so did not yet have a chance to buy the good, and older consumers, who could
buy from the previous seller but chose not to do so. For 0 ￿ p ￿ 1, denote by ￿M(p) the
seller’s expected proﬁt from selling the good at that price to young consumers only, assum-
ing that each such consumer who values the good at more than p buys it. This deﬁnes the
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Figure1: Themonopolyproﬁtfunction￿M ofasellerwhoisuncertainaboutthetime￿ since
the last seller appeared: with probability 2
3, ￿ = 1
4, and with probability 1
3, ￿ = 1
2. The con-
sumers are impatient, either because of declining valuations (solid line) or time discounting
(dashed line). The monopoly proﬁt function peaks at the monopoly price, which is pM = 3
4
in the ﬁrst case and pM = 1
2 in the second case.
seller’s monopoly proﬁt function ￿M : [0;1] ! [0;1], the form of which depends on the kind
of consumers’ impatience (see Figure 1). With declining valuations,
￿M(p) = p E[min(￿;1 ￿ p)]; (1)
and with time discounting,
￿M(p) = E[min(￿;1)]p (1 ￿ p): (2)
In these equations, ￿ is the time from the appearance of the previous seller and the expec-
tation is with respect to the seller’s beliefs. Thus, one seller’s ￿M may be different from an-
other’s. The unique (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A) maximum point 0 < pM < 1 of ￿M is the
seller’s monopoly price, and ￿M(pM) is his monopoly proﬁt. With declining valuations, dif-
ferent sellers generally have different monopoly prices, but with time discounting, pM = 1
2
always.
The counterpart on the consumers’ side of monopolistic pricing is the monopoly strat-
egy. This strategy, which is oblivious to the current market conditions and the history, simply
instructs the consumer to buy the good whenever doing so yields him positive payoff (with
the decision in the borderline case of zero payoff from buying left unspeciﬁed, as it is incon-
sequential both to the consumer and to the other agents). The monopoly strategy would be
optimal if the possibility of buying from a later seller were absent.
4 Uninformed Sellers
The case of uninformed sellers may be viewed as a benchmark. In the next section, we com-
pare it to the arguably more realistic, but more involved, case of informed sellers, and thus
gain appreciation of the effect of the sellers’ information on their proﬁts.
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Figure 2: Maximum equilibrium prices in Example 1 as a function of the sellers’ arrival rate
￿. When players have declining valuations, the equilbrium price is in fact unique (thick solid
line), and coincides with the seller’ monopoly price. With time discounting, the maximum
equilibrium price (thick dashed line) is lower than the monopoly price (thin dashed line).
By deﬁnition, uninformed sellers do not know the previous sellers’ prices and the con-
sumers’ response to them. In addition, they may know the previous sellers’ arrival times only
if this information can be inferred from their own arrival time. Therefore, if the time of ar-
rival does not provide any information about how long ago the previous sellers appeared, it
is reasonable to expect that the prices the sellers set will be identical. Under the same as-
sumption, the uninformed sellers all have the same monopoly price. The next two examples
look at whether these two prices are equal. All the assertions made concerning these and the
other examples in this article are proved in Appendix B.
Example 1 Uninformed sellers arrive according to a Poisson process. That is, the time ￿ from
one seller to the next is independent of past arrivals and has an exponential distribution with
parameter ￿, which is the sellers’ arrival rate. If the consumers have declining valuations,
there is an equilibrium in which all sellers set the same price, and the same is true with time
discounting if the discount rate ￿ is sufﬁciently low. In the ﬁrst case, the equilibrium price
is unique, and is equal to the sellers’ common monopoly price. In the second case, there are
multiple equilibrium prices, which are all lower than the monopoly price.
Anadditionaldifferencebetweenthetwoformsofconsumers’impatienceinExample1is
that,asFigure2shows,withdecliningvaluations,theequilibriumpriceincreasesratherthan
decreases as the sellers’ arrival rate increases and competition thus intensiﬁes. This seem-
ingly paradoxical ﬁnding is a consequence of declining valuations.4 The price rises because
whensellersarrivesoonaftereachother, theyfacerelativelyyoungpotentialcustomers, who
are willing to pay more. Parenthetically, the negative effect of this price increase on social
welfare is not strong enough to negate the positive effect of the shorter waiting times to the
4Chen and Frank (2004) observe a somewhat similar phenomenon in a queuing system. In their model, a
monopolistic server charges a proﬁt-maximizing service fee. Because an increase in the number of customers
admitted increases the expected queuing time, this fee generally declines with demand.
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Figure 3: Monopoly prices and maximum equilibrim prices in Example 2 as a function of the
time s between the two sellers’ arrivals. In the case in which consumers have declining valu-
ations, the equibrlium price (thick solid line) is in fact unique, when it exists, and coincides
with the sellers’ monopoly price (thin solid line). In the case of time discounting, with unit
discount rate ￿ = 1, the maximum equilibrium price (thick dashed line) is lower than the
monopoly price (thin dashed line).
next seller. As the sellers’ arrival rate increases, so does the expected total equilibrium payoff
in any time interval.
The next example differs in that, even with consumers having declining valuations, the
sellers’ identical monopoly price is not necessarily an equilibrium price. Indeed, for both
forms of consumer impatience, an equilibrium with a common equilibrium price may not
exist (see Figure 3). The basic reason for the possible nonexistence of an equilibrium price is
that such a price is required to leave sellers with no incentive to either increase or decrease
their prices. These two requirements may well be contradictory, as they involve different
kinds of considerations. The proﬁtability of a price decrease depends on the existence in the
market of old consumers, who had a chance to buy at the equilibrium price but did not do
so, whereas the proﬁtability of a price increase depends on the consumers’ willingness to
buy also at the higher price rather than wait to the next seller who will sell at the equilibrium
price.
Example 2 There are two, uninformed sellers, one arriving 0 < s < 1 units of time after the
other. Anarrivingsellerdoesnotknowwhetherheisﬁrstorsecondbuttheconsumersdoknow
that.5 If the consumers have declining valuations, then an equilibrium in which both sellers
set the same price exists if and only if s ￿ 1
5+
p
32 (￿ 0:094), and that price is unique and is
equal to the sellers’ monopoly price. With time discounting, equilibria in which both sellers set
the same price exist if and only if e￿￿s ￿ 1
2, and these equilibrium prices are all lower than the
monopoly price.
5The sellers’ ignorance of their relative position can be modeled as follows. Let t be a random variable that
is uniformly distributed on [0;K], for some ﬁxed large number K. Suppose that the sellers’ arrival times are
:::;￿K + t;￿K + t + s;t;t + s;K + t;K + t + S;2K + t;2K + t + s;:::. Thus, there are inﬁnitely many pairs of
sellers as above, which do not inﬂuence one another because of the long time periods separating them. As the
consumers know the history of previous arrivals, (only) they can tell when the next seller will arrive.
8The relations seen in the above examples between the monopoly and equilibrium prices
hold very generally. This is shown by the following theorem, which, as proved in Appendix A,
holds even under more general assumptions than those in Section 1. In particular, it holds
withanydiscountfunction,notonlyanexponentialone,andforcertainkindsofnon-linearly
declining valuations. The same applies to Theorem 2 below.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the sellers are uninformed and that there is an equilibrium in which
they all set the same price pE. If the consumers have declining valuations, then pE necessar-
ily coincides with the monopoly price of each of the sellers. But with time discounting, pE is
necessarily lower than the sellers’ common monopoly price.
AsTheorem1shows,whethercompetitionwithfuturesellersreducesthemonopolypower
of uninformed sellers depends on the form of the consumers’ impatience. The proof of the
theorem in Appendix A shows the reason for this dependence.
Tounderstandthereason,recallthataseller’smonopolyproﬁtfunctionspeciﬁesthecon-
nection between his proﬁt and the price he sets under the counterfactual assumption that
consumers are only allowed to buy the good from the ﬁrst seller they meet. Suppose that
the monopoly price, which maximizes the function, is the same for all sellers and that they
all set that price. A seller who unilaterally deviates by slightly reducing his price decreases
his monopoly proﬁt, but on the other hand, attracts potential consumers of the previous
sellers for whom the monopoly price was just a little high. As for every differentiable func-
tion, atthemaximumpointofthemonopolyproﬁtfunctiontheﬁrst-order effectofchanging
the argument is zero. With time discounting, this means that the positive effect of attract-
ing old consumers dominates, so that the price reduction is proﬁtable. This explains why,
in this case, an equilibrium price must be lower than the monopoly price. With declining
valuations, this is not so. In this case, the positive effect of the price reduction is also of low
order. This is because the time that passed since the previous sellers’ visits means that, to
attract their potential customer who are still in the market, a more drastic price reduction is
needed.
Asimilardifferencebetweenthetwoformsofconsumers’impatienceappliesalsotoprice
increases. The effect of raising the price to slightly above the competitors’ price can again be
decomposed into an effect on the monopoly proﬁt and an additional effect, which in this
case is negative and expresses the loss that results from some consumers’ decision to wait
to the next seller. The second effect is again of low order in the case of declining valua-
tions, which means that the condition for proﬁt maximization coincides with the ﬁrst-order
condition of zero marginal monopoly proﬁt. Therefore, with declining valuations, only the
monopoly price can be an equilibrium price. By contrast, with time discounting, the loss of
customers to the competition is of the same order as (in other words, roughly proportional
to) the price increase. Herein lies the crucial difference from Diamond’s (1971) model, where
a seller can increase his price with impunity to above the competitors’ price as long as the
price gap remains below the consumers’ switching cost. This difference explains why, with
timediscounting, theconclusionthatanequilibriumpricemustbethemonopolypricedoes
not hold.
Different equilibrium prices
When sellers differ in their beliefs about how long ago the previous sellers arrived, they may
well differ also in the prices they set in equilibrium. In this case, even if the consumers have
declining valuations, each seller may have a unique equilibrium price that is different from
his monopoly price. This is demonstrated by the following example, in which the two sellers
are uninformed but they know whether they are ﬁrst or second as well as the length of the
time interval between their arrivals. Depending on the latter, the two sellers’ equilibrium
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Figure 4: The equilbrium prices for the ﬁrst and second seller (black and gray line, respec-
tively) in Example 3 as a function of the time s between their arrivals. Prices in the shaded
area that are lower than the ﬁrst seller’s monoploy price of 1
2 are not equilbrium prices for
him in this example, but they are so in Example 4 (in the case where the probability that the
second seller arrives is 1
2).
prices may be lower than their respective monopoly prices, may coincide with them, or may
not exist (see Figure 4).
Example 3 One seller arrives for sure at time 0. A second, uninformed seller arrives with prob-
ability 1
2 at (a ﬁxed) time 0 < s < 1, and with probability 1
2 he never appears. The consumers
have declining valuations. If s ￿ 1
26 or s ￿ 1
8+
p
48, there is a unique equilibrium price for each
seller, which is respectively lower than or equal to his monopoly price, but if 1
26 < s < 1
8+
p
48,
an equilibrium does not exist.
The reason the second seller in Example 3 sets a price lower than his monopoly price
(and than the ﬁrst seller’s price) if he comes almost immediately after the ﬁrst seller, s ￿ 1
26
(￿ 0:038), is that he has in this case only very few potential customers who are young and
willing to pay a high price for the good. The seller can therefore proﬁt from setting a low
price, which will attract some of the old consumers born before the ﬁrst seller appeared.
Anticipating this price reduction, some consumers who would gain little by buying from the
ﬁrst seller wait for the second seller. Therefore, the ﬁrst seller cannot assume that all the
consumers with positive payoff from buying will do so, which forces him to lower his price
and receive a proﬁt lower than his monopoly one. The proﬁt for the second seller exceeds his
monopoly proﬁt, which he can always get regardless of what the ﬁrst seller does.
5 Informed Sellers
If the inter-arrival time in Example 3 is not very short, s ￿ 1
8+
p
48 (￿ 0:067), the above ar-
gument does not apply and the monopoly prices are in fact equilibrium prices. The same
conclusion holds much more generally. In particular, it holds with informed as well as un-
informed sellers, as long as sellers never appear in very short succession and (as in Example
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Figure5: Theconsumers’equilibriumstrategyinExample4. Aconsumerbuysthegoodfrom
the ﬁrst seller if and only if his age and the price fall within the shaded area. The depicted
strategy corresponds to an equilibrium price of p￿ = 23
53 and to the case where the second
seller comes with probability one-half 4
53 units of time after the ﬁrst seller.
3) they know how long ago the previous seller arrived. Moreover, the exact meaning of ‘very
short’ here is the same as in the example.
Theorem 2 Regardless of whether the sellers are informed or uninformed, if each of them
knows the time since the appearance of the previous seller and that time is never shorter than
1
8+
p
48, and if the consumers have declining valuations, there is an equilibrium in which every
seller sells at his monopoly price and every consumer that gets positive payoff from buying at
that price does so.
Wherethecasesofinformedanduninformedsellersfundamentallydiffer,evenunderthe
special circumstances considered by Theorem 2, is the existence of equilibrium prices lower
than the monopoly ones. Getting such prices requires the consumers to play an active role,
so to speak, in the determination of the prices, and punish a seller who sets a high price by
reducing his sells. Crucially, the next seller must be able to know that not all the consumers
who could buy from his predecessor did buy, so that he can set his own price accordingly.
The following example demonstrates this possibility. It differs from Example 3 mainly in
that the second seller is informed (and also in only considering inter-arrival times that fall
within a speciﬁc, narrow range, but on the other hand, allowing the second seller to appear
with high probability, and even with certainty). The difference results in additional equilib-
ria, in which the ﬁrst seller sets lower prices than his monopoly price of 1
2 (see Figure 4).
Example 4 One seller arrives for sure at time 0. A second, informed seller arrives with proba-
bility 1
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 at (a ﬁxed) time 1
8+
p
48 ￿ s ￿ 1
10, and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ he never appears.
Theconsumershavedecliningvaluations. Foranygivenprice￿s+(2 ￿ ￿)
p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿ p￿ ￿ 1
2,
there is an equilibrium in which the ﬁrst seller’s price is p￿ and the second seller’s price is 1 ￿ s.
The consumers’ equilibrium strategy in this example is to buy the good from the second
seller at any price that gives them positive payoff, but to buy from the ﬁrst seller only if the
11price also does not exceed some threshold, which depends on their age. Speciﬁcally, older
consumers, who would receive low payoff from buying the good from the ﬁrst seller at the
equilibrium price p￿; do not buy it at any higher price, but younger consumers may do so
(see Figure 5). This strategy entails that the punishment of a seller who sets a higher price
thanp￿ reﬂectstheseverityofthedeviation;itisnotanall-or-nothingpunishment. Anall-or-
nothing punishment strategy would not be credible here. This is because, if a price p that is
notmuchhigherthanp￿ promptedaboycottoftheﬁrstsellerbyalltheconsumers,including
the younger ones, who are willing to pay more, the second seller would have less incentive to
lower his price. That price would then leave the older consumers with lower payoff than they
would get from buying from the ﬁrst seller at price p, which means that joining the others in
severely punishing that seller was against their own interests.
Credibility, that is, rationality of the off-equilibrium behavior speciﬁed by the agents’
strategies, is an important consideration. Even with a single seller, equilibria exist in which
a price lower than the monopoly price is supported by a consumers’ threat not to buy at any
higher price. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect. If the seller sets a mod-
erately high price, it may be optimal for individual consumers to buy the good after all. A
credible threat is possible only with sequential competition, and only if the sellers are sufﬁ-
ciently informed about the previous sellers’ behavior or about the consumers’ demand.
As all the equilibria identiﬁed in Example 4 satisfy the credibility requirement, and both
sellers and consumers are informed, none of the equilibria is eliminated by any obvious no-
tion of equilibrium reﬁnement. Multiplicity of equilibrium prices in this example thus ap-
pears to be a robust inherent property.
A Proofs: Theorems
The following proofs of the articles’ two theorems actually concern more general forms of
consumers’ impatience than speciﬁed in Section 2.
For the case of time discounting, the exponential discount function is replaced by any
continuous and strictly decreasing function D : [0;1] ! [0;1] with D(0) = 1. In addition, the
assumption that the distribution of the consumers’ valuations is uniform is generalized by
allowing any continuous distribution on on the unit interval [0;1], with cumulative distribu-
tion function F and density f, such that there is a unique value of p maximizing
p(1 ￿ F(p)):
Thatmaximumpoint0 < pM < 1isthesellers’(common)monopolyprice. Correspondingly,
the equation for the monopoly proﬁt function is generalized from (2) to
￿M(p) = E[min(￿;1)]p(1 ￿ F(p)):
For the case of declining valuations, the assumption in Section 2 is that the valuation
function v : [0;1] ! [0;1], which speciﬁes the consumers’ valuation v(x) at each age x, de-
creases linearly from 1 to 0, which implies the same for the function a : [0;1] ! [0;1] deﬁned
by
a(p) = maxf0 ￿ x ￿ 1 j v (x) ￿ pg;
which speciﬁes the maximum age of the consumers who may buy at each price p. Thus, the
function ￿S : [0;1] ! [0;1] deﬁned by
￿S(p) = pa(p);
which is the monopoly proﬁt function of a seller who knows that no other seller arrived in
the previous unit of time, is quadratic and strictly concave and has a maximum at p = 1
2.
12This assumption is generalized by allowing the valuation function to be any continuous and
strictly decreasing function with v(0) = 1 (but possibly v(1) > 06) such that the correspond-
ing function ￿S, deﬁned as above, is concave, has a unique maximum point 0 < pS < 1, and
is strictly concave (and, necessarily, strictly decreasing) in [pS;1].7 As the following lemma
shows, the monopoly proﬁt function of any seller automatically have similar properties. This
function ￿M : [0;1] ! [0;1], which generalizes (1), is given by
￿M(p) = p E[min(￿;a(p))] = E[min(￿p;￿S(p))]; (3)
wheretheexpectationiswithrespecttotheseller’sbeliefsaboutthetime￿ fromtheprevious
seller’s appearance. If the seller knows ￿;the expectation symbol E may be dropped.
Lemma 1 If the consumers have declining valuations, then the monopoly proﬁt function ￿M
ofanyselleriscontinuousandconcavein[0;1],hasauniquemaximumpoint0 < pM < 1,and
isstrictlyconcavein[pM;1]. Ifthesellerknowsthetime￿ fromthepreviousseller’sappearance,
pM = max(pS;v(￿)).
Proof. As the function ￿S is assumed concave, and is easily seen to be continuous, the func-
tions
fmin(sp;￿S(p))gs>0
are equicontinuous and concave in [0;1], and therefore ￿M is also continuous and concave.
LetpM beamaximumpointof￿M. AstheassumptionconcerningpS impliesthatmin(sp;￿S(p)) <
min(spS;￿S(pS)) for all p < pS and s > 0, necessarily pM ￿ pS. To prove that the maxi-
mum point is unique, it sufﬁces to show that ￿M has no other maximum point in the interval
[pM;1]. For this, it sufﬁces to show that ￿M is strictly concave there. Strict concavity fol-
lows from the claim below. This is because it follows from the claim and from the fact that
the function a is nonincreasing that, with positive probability, min(￿p;￿S(p)) = ￿S(p) for all
pM ￿ p ￿ 1. As￿S isstrictlyconcaveontheinterval[pM;1],thisimpliesthat￿M isalsostrictly
concave (rather than just concave) there.
Claim With positive probability, ￿ ￿ a(pM).
Suppose otherwise, that ￿ < a(pM) almost surely, so that
￿M(pM) = pME[￿]: (4)
The concavity of ￿S implies that this function, and hence also a, have one-sided derivatives
at pM. Therefore, there exists some ￿ > 0 such that, for sufﬁciently small ￿ > 0,
a(pM) ￿ a(pM + ￿)
￿
<
E[￿]
￿
: (5)
The continuity of a implies that Pr(￿ > a(pM + ￿)) < ￿ for sufﬁciently small 0 < ￿ < 1 ￿ pM.
6It is occasionally convenient to view v as deﬁned on the whole nonnegative ray, with v(x) = 0 for x > 1. This
means that it may have a discontinuity point at 1.
7The conditions on ￿S hold, for example, if v is a concave, piece-wise linear function. They also hold for the
power functions v(x) = (1 ￿ x)
￿ (￿ > 0), the normalized exponential functions v(x) =
￿x￿￿
1￿￿ (0 < ￿ 6= 1),
and more generally, whenever (
1
v)
00 > 0 in (0;1) and v(1) = 0. (This result follows from the identity ￿
00
S ￿ v =
(
v
v0)
3 ￿ 1
v
￿00.)
13However, this inequality and (5) lead to a contradiction:
0 > ￿
￿
a(pM) ￿ a(pM + ￿)
￿
￿ ￿E[￿]
￿ Pr(￿ > a(pM + ￿))
￿
a(pM) ￿ a(pM + ￿)
￿
￿ ￿E[￿]
￿
￿
pM + ￿
￿
E
￿
￿ ￿ min(￿;a(pM + ￿))
￿
￿ ￿E[￿]
= pME[￿] ￿
￿
pM + ￿
￿
E
￿
min(￿;a(pM + ￿))
￿
= ￿M(pM) ￿ ￿M(pM + ￿)
￿ 0;
where the third inequality holds because a(pM) > ￿ almost surely and pM +￿ < 1, the second
equality holds by (3) and (4), and the last inequality holds because pM is a maximum point of
￿M. This contradiction proves the claim.
Consider now the case where the seller knows ￿. By deﬁnition of a, a price p satisﬁes
a(p) ￿ ￿ if and only if p lies in [0;v(￿)]. Hence, by (3), ￿M(p) = ￿p for all p in that interval,
so that ￿M is strictly increasing there, and ￿M(p) = ￿S(p) for all p outside it. If v(￿) ￿ pS,
then ￿S, and hence also ￿M, are strictly decreasing in the closed interval [v(￿);1], so that
they attain their maximum there at the point v(￿), at which ￿M = ￿v(￿). If v(￿) < pS, then
both ￿S and ￿M attain their maximum at pS, where ￿M = ￿S(pS). This proves that pM =
max(pS;v(￿)).
A.1 Theorem 1
First case: declining valuations.
The equilibrium condition requires the expected proﬁt ￿(pE) for any single seller from
setting the equilibrium price pE to be greater than or equal to the expected proﬁt ￿(p) from
setting any other price 0 ￿ p ￿ 1. We have to show that this condition cannot in fact hold if
pE is not equal to the seller’s monopoly price pM.
If pE > pM, then
￿(pE) = ￿M(pE) < ￿M(pM) ￿ ￿(pM): (6)
The equality holds because the assumption of declining valuations implies that at equilib-
riumconsumersneverwaittothenextseller,andthereforeanyconsumerwhowasbornafter
the arrival of the previous seller will buy the good at price pE if this gives him positive payoff,
while any consumer born before the arrival of the previous seller but did not buy from him
will also not buy now. By the deﬁnition of the monopoly proﬁt function, this means that the
seller’s expected proﬁt from selling at the equilibrium price pE is ￿M(pE). The strict inequal-
ity holds because pM is the unique maximizer of ￿M. The weak inequality holds because the
lower price pM may also attract consumers who were born before the arrival of the previous
seller but did not buy from him (at price pE). It follows from (6) that, if pE > pM,then the
seller would gain from reducing the price to pM.
Suppose now that pE < pM. Consider a price pE < p ￿ 1 and a consumer for whom
buying the good is an optimal decision if the price is pE and waiting is an optimal decision
if the price is p. Thus, the consumer’s age x is such that (i) v(x) ￿ pE ￿ 0 and (ii) v(x) ￿ p is
less than or equal to the consumer’s expected utility if he defers buying the good. Condition
(ii) holds for two kinds of consumers: those for whom the difference v(x)￿p is negative, and
consumers for whom it is nonnegative but not greater than the expected payoff from waiting
forthenextseller. Intherestoftheproof,themainideaistoshowthat,forpsufﬁcientlyclose
to pE, consumers of the ﬁrst kind greatly outnumber those of the second kind, so that the
anticipated arrival of future sellers has a vanishingly small effect on consumers’ decisions.
For a consumer of age x who defers buying, the payoff is v(x + ￿) ￿ pE if the waiting time
￿ to the next seller makes this expression positive; otherwise the payoff is zero. Condition (ii)
14above is therefore equivalent to v(x) ￿ p ￿ E[max(v(x + ￿) ￿ pE;0)], or
E
￿
min
￿
v(x) ￿ pE;v(x) ￿ v(x + ￿)
￿￿
￿ p ￿ pE; (7)
where the expectation is with respect to the consumers’ beliefs about ￿, that is, about when
the next seller will arrive. (As, by assumption, all the consumers are informed, their beliefs
about￿ areidentical.)Iftheconsumersknowwhenthenextsellerwillarrive, thedistribution
of (the random variable) ￿ is degenerate.
Fix ￿ > 0. By the assumption in Section 2, there is some (small) 0 < ￿ < 1 that makes
Pr(￿ > ￿) > 1
1+￿. Asbyassumptionv iscontinuousandstrictlydecreasingintheunitinterval,
there is some price pE < p <
pM+￿pE
1+￿ that is sufﬁciently close to pE to make
v(x) ￿ v(x + ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
(8)
for all 0 ￿ x ￿ 1 ￿ ￿. It follows from (8) that for any consumer whose age y satisﬁes v(y) ￿
pE+(1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
,ifthewaitingtime￿ satisﬁes￿ > ￿(whichmeansthateither￿ < ￿ ￿ 1￿y
or 1 ￿ y < ￿; and in the latter case, trivially v(y + ￿) = 0), then
min
￿
v(y) ￿ pE;v(y) ￿ v(y + ￿)
￿
￿ (1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
:
Therefore, for a consumer of such an age y;
E
￿
min
￿
v(y) ￿ pE;v(y) ￿ v(y + ￿)
￿￿
￿ Pr(￿ > ￿)(1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
> p ￿ pE:
Thus, (7) does not hold for x = y, and therefore a consumer of this age prefers buying the
good at price p over waiting for the next seller. This conclusion shows that the age x of any
consumer who is willing to wait satisﬁes v(x) < pE +(1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
. If, in addition, v(x) ￿ p
(that is, if the consumer is of the second kind considered above), then
a(pE + (1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
) < x ￿ a(p): (9)
If the seller charges pE, he sells to all the consumers who were born after the previous
seller appeared and have positive payoff from buying at pE. The expected proﬁt is then
￿M(pE). Raising the price to p changes the proﬁt to some other value, ￿(p). The consumers’
response to the price increase may be thought of as having two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, all
the consumers with positive payoff from buying at price p still do so, giving the seller a proﬁt
of ￿M(p). In the second stage, the consumers who are better off waiting to the next seller
drop out. The resulting reduction in the number of customers is constrained by (9), which
gives the following upper bound on the second-stage loss of proﬁt:
￿M(p) ￿ ￿(p) ￿ p
￿
a(p) ￿ a(pE + (1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
)
￿
: (10)
Because, by Lemma 1, ￿M is concave and has a maximum only at pM, and pE < p < pM,
￿M(p) ￿ ￿M(pE)
p ￿ pE ￿ R; (11)
where
R =
￿M(pM) ￿ ￿M(pE)
pM ￿ pE > 0:
Inequalities (10) and (11) give
￿(p) ￿ ￿M(pE)
p ￿ pE ￿ R + p
 
a(pE + (1 + ￿)
￿
p ￿ pE￿
) ￿ a(pE)
p ￿ pE ￿
a(p) ￿ a(pE)
p ￿ pE
!
: (12)
15If pE = 0, the right-hand side of (12) tends to R as p tends to pE. If pE > 0, it tends to
R + ￿pEa0(pE
+), where a0(pE
+) is the right derivative of a at pE. (The existence of this one-
sided derivative follows from its necessary existence for the convex function ￿S.) There-
fore, choosing sufﬁciently small ￿ guarantees that in both cases the limit is positive, so that
￿(p) > ￿M(pE) for p sufﬁciently close to (but greater than) pE. Thus, raising the price by a
small amount increases the seller’s proﬁt. This conclusion contradicts the assumption that
pE is an equilibrium price.
Second case: time discounting.
The proof that pE > pM cannot hold is identical to that in the ﬁrst case. Suppose that
pE = pM. The equilibrium proﬁt of a seller is given by
￿(pE) = ￿M(pE) = E[min(￿;1)]pE (1 ￿ F(pE));
where ￿ is the time since the last seller’s visit. Choosing a lower price, p < pE; would change
the proﬁt to
￿(p) = E[min(￿;1)] p(1 ￿ F(p)) + E[max(1 ￿ ￿;0)] p
￿
F(pE) ￿ F(p)
￿
;
where the ﬁrst term, which is equal to ￿M(p), is the revenue from consumers born after the
arrival of the previous seller and the second term represents older consumers with p < v <
pE. It is not difﬁcult to check that the above equalities give:
￿(pE) ￿ ￿(p)
pE ￿ p
=
1
E[min(￿;1)]
￿M(pE) ￿ ￿M(p)
pE ￿ p
￿ E[max(1 ￿ ￿;0)](1 ￿ F(pE)):
The ﬁrst term on the right tends to zero as p tends to pE = pM, because, at the maximum
point, ￿
0
M = 0. Therefore, if the probability that ￿ < 1 is greater than zero, the right-, and
hencealsotheleft-handsideisnegativeforpsufﬁcientlycloseto(andsmallerthan)pE. Thus,
pE can be a proﬁt-maximizing price only for a seller who knows that ￿ ￿ 1. However, as
indicated (see Section 2), there is nonzero probability that this is not the case for at least
some sellers. This contradiction proves that pM cannot in fact be an equilibrium price.
A.2 Theorem 2
Suppose that the assumptions in the theorem hold, and the consumers have a valuation
function of the general form speciﬁed above. The lower bound on the time from one seller to
the next stated in the theorem is correspondingly replaced by the smallest solution s1 of the
equation
sv(s) = max
0￿p￿1
￿
p
￿
a(p) ￿ a(pS)
￿￿
: (13)
This equation has at least one solution s in the interval [0;a(pS)], because the valuation
function is continuous and 0 ￿ v(0) ￿ maxp
￿
p
￿
a(p) ￿ a(pS)
￿￿
￿ maxp [pa(p)] = pS a(pS) ￿
a(pS)v(a(pS)). For the originally considered special case of linear valuation function, v(x) =
1￿x,thesmallestsolutioniss1 = 1
8+
p
48 ￿ 0:067,becausea(p) = 1￿pandpS = argmaxp [p a(p)] =1
2,
so that (13) is the quadratic equation s(1 ￿ s) = 1
16.8
Suppose that each seller sets his monopoly price, which by Lemma 1 is given by
pM = max(pS;v(￿)) ￿ v(￿);
8The linear valuation function is a limit case of the one-parameter family of exponentially-decreasing valua-
tion functions v(x) =
￿x￿￿
1￿￿ , with 0 < ￿ 6= 1. It can be shown numerically that, for every such ￿, s1 is less than
about 0:082.
16where ￿ is the time since the appearance of the previous seller. Any consumers born earlier
would not buy at that price, which means that, for him, the price is not worth waiting to.
Therefore, it is optimal for a consumer to buy at the ﬁrst opportunity, if his valuation then is
notlowerthantherequestedprice. Notethat, bytheabovecharacterizationofthemonopoly
prices, the last condition may not hold only if the requested price is pS.
It follows from this analysis of the consumers’ behavior that, if all the sellers choose their
monopoly prices pM, each of them receives his monopoly proﬁt ￿M(pM). It remains to prove
that no single seller would get a higher proﬁt by choosing any price p 6= pM.
If p > pM, then, as explained above, no consumer born before the arrival of the previous
seller will buy at that price, which means that the seller’s proﬁt is at most ￿M(p) (￿ ￿M(pM),
by deﬁnition of pM). If p < pM, then some consumers born before the arrival of the previous
seller may buy. However, these consumers are rather old, speciﬁcally, older by at least a(pS)
than any of the consumers born after the previous seller’s arrival. This is because, as indi-
cated, a consumer does not buy from a seller (at the seller’s monopoly price) only if the price
the seller sets is pS and his valuation is less than or equal to that, which means that the con-
sumer’s age is at least a(pS). Therefore, if p is low enough to appeal to some old consumers
(as well as to the young ones), the sellers’ proﬁt is at most p
￿
a(p) ￿ a(pS)
￿
. By deﬁnition of
s1, the last expression does not exceed s 1v(s1), which by the assumption s 1 ￿ ￿ is equal to
￿M(v(s1)) (￿ ￿M(pM)).
B Proofs: Examples
This appendix proves the assertions made in the article’s four examples.
B.1 Example 1
SupposethatallthesellerssetthesamepricepE. Anyequilibriumstrategyfortheconsumers
must specify that they buy the good at that price or lower if doing so gives them positive pay-
off. It must also specify that they buy or do not buy at any higher price if the corresponding
payoff is higher or lower, respectively, than that expected from waiting to and (optionally)
buying from the next seller at price pE. Therefore, pE is an equilibrium price if and only if,
when all the sellers sell at that price and the consumers’ strategy satisﬁes the above condi-
tions, no seller can gain from setting a price p 6= pE. Below, we investigate this equilibrium
condition in the two cases of consumers’ impatience described in Section 2.
First case: declining valuations.
WeshowbelowthatanecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionforpE tobeanequilibriumprice
is that p = pE is a solution of the equation
p +
1
￿
ln(1 + ￿p) = 1: (14)
Consider ﬁrst a seller who deviates by setting a higher price, p > pE. The payoff of a
consumer of age x < 1 ￿ p from buying at price p is 1 ￿ x ￿ p. The payoff from waiting to
the next seller (who will sell in price pE) is 1 ￿ (x + ￿) ￿ pE if this expression is positive and 0
otherwise,where￿ isthe(random)waitingtimetothenextseller. Hence,theexpectedpayoff
from waiting is
Z 1￿x￿pE
0
￿
1 ￿ (x + ￿) ￿ pE￿
￿e￿￿￿d￿ = 1 ￿ x ￿ (pE +
1
￿
) +
1
￿
e￿￿(1￿x￿pE):
17Comparison of the two payoffs shows that a necessary condition for selling any units at all at
price p is
p < pE +
1
￿
;
which means that the price difference must be lower than the expected waiting time to the
next seller, 1
￿. If this condition holds, then a consumer of age x is better off buying imme-
diately (at price p) than waiting to the next seller or not buying at all if and only if x < xp,
where
xp = 1 ￿ pE +
1
￿
ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
p ￿ pE￿￿
: (15)
Itisnotdifﬁculttoseethatthethresholdvaluexp islowerthan1￿p. Ifpositive, itistheageat
which a consumer is indifferent between buying and waiting. If negative, no consumer will
buy at price p.
The seller’s expected proﬁt ￿(p) from setting a price pE < p < pE + 1
￿ with xp > 0 can
be computed as follows. From the seller’s perspective, the time ￿ since the previous seller
appeared is exponentially distributed with parameter ￿. A consumer who did not buy from
that seller at price pE will certainly not buy at the higher price p. Therefore,
￿(p) = p E[min(￿;xp)]
= p
"Z xp
0
￿se￿￿sds +
Z 1
xp
￿xpe￿￿sds
#
=
p
￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿xp
￿
=
p
￿
 
1 ￿
e￿￿(1￿pE)
1 ￿ ￿(p ￿ pE)
!
;
where the last equality follows from (15). Differentiation gives
￿0(p) =
1
￿
￿
e￿￿(1￿pE) ￿
1 + ￿pE￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿(p ￿ pE))2 :
The derivative is decreasing for pE < p < pE + 1
￿, and therefore ￿(p) ￿ ￿(pE) for all such p if
and only if ￿0(pE) ￿ 0, or
e￿(1￿pE) ￿ 1 + ￿pE: (16)
Consider next a price p ￿ pe. Any consumer of age x < 1 ￿ p will buy at that price.
However, such a consumer is still in the market only if no previous seller arrived s units of
time earlier, for every x ￿ (1 ￿ pE) < s < x (as the consumer would have bought the good
from such a seller). The probability of this is e￿￿x if x < 1 ￿ pE, and e￿￿(1￿pE) if x ￿ 1 ￿ pE.
Therefore, the expected proﬁt of a seller selling at price p is
￿(p) = p
"Z 1￿pE
0
e￿￿xdx +
Z 1￿p
1￿pE
e￿￿(1￿pE)dx
#
=
p
￿
￿
1 ￿
￿
1 + ￿
￿
p ￿ pE￿￿
e￿￿(1￿pE)
￿
:
Asthisisaquadratic, concavefunction, theinequality￿(p)￿ ￿(pE)holdsforallp ￿ pE ifand
only if ￿0(pE) ￿ 0, or
e￿(1￿pE) ￿ 1 + ￿pE:
The price pE satisﬁes both the last inequality and the reverse one (16) if and only if it
solves (14). This proves that the latter is indeed a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for an
equilibrium price.
18Equation (14) has a unique solution, because the expression on the left-hand side is
strictly increasing and is less or greater than 1 for p = 0 or p = 1, respectively. The solution
is equal to the sellers’ monopoly price pM. This is because the exponential distribution (with
parameter ￿) of the time ￿ since the arrival of the previous seller implies that the monopoly
proﬁt function is
￿M(p) = pE[min(￿;1 ￿ p)]
= p
￿Z 1￿p
0
￿se￿￿sds +
Z 1
1￿p
(1 ￿ p)￿e￿￿sds
￿
=
p
￿
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿(1￿p)
￿
:
The monopoly price pM maximizes ￿M, and hence satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
d￿M
dp
=
1
￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 + ￿p)e￿￿(1￿p)
￿
= 0;
which is equivalent to (14).
Equation (14) gives the equilibrium price as an implicit function of the sellers’ arrival rate
￿. Thisfunctiontendsto 1
2 as￿tendsto0, anditisstrictlyincreasing(seeFigure2). Thelatter
can be seen by implicitly differentiating (14), which gives the equality
￿
1 +
1
1 + ￿p
￿
dp
d￿
+
1
￿2
￿
1 ￿
1
1 + ￿p
￿ ln(1 + ￿p)
￿
= 0:
Because 1 ￿ 1
1+x ￿ ln(1 + x) < 0 for all x > 0, the equality proves that
dpE
d￿ > 0. Together
with (14), it also gives the upper bound
dpE
d￿ < (pE)2. This is because it follows from the two
equalities that
p2 ￿
dp
d￿
= (
1
￿
+ p)(p ￿
1
2 + ￿p
);
and the right-hand side is positive for p = pE > 1
2.
Considernowtheeffectofthesellers’arrivalrateonsocialwelfare. Thelatterisexpressed
by the expectation of a consumer’s valuation of the good at the time he buys it, which is 1
minus his age x (and is zero if the consumer leaves the market without buying). As only
consumers younger than 1 ￿ pE buy the good, the expectation in question is
Z 1￿pE
0
(1 ￿ x)￿e￿￿xdx = 1 ￿
1 + (￿pE ￿ 1)e￿￿(1￿pE)
￿
= 1 ￿
2
￿ + 1
pE
;
where the second equality uses (14). The expression in the last denominator increases with
increasing ￿, because, as shown above,
d
d￿
￿
￿ +
1
pE
￿
= 1 ￿
1
(pE)2
dpE
d￿
> 0:
This proves that social welfare also increases.
Second case: time discounting.
Each seller’s expected proﬁt is equal to the monopoly proﬁt from setting the price pE:
￿(pE) = ￿M(pE) = E[min(￿;1)] pE (1 ￿ pE);
with
19E[min(￿;1)] =
Z 1
0
P(￿ > x)dx =
Z 1
0
e￿￿x dx =
1 ￿ e￿￿
￿
: (17)
Setting a lower price, p < pE, would change a seller’s proﬁt to
￿(p) = E[min(￿;1)] p (1 ￿ pE) + p (pE ￿ p);
where the decomposition reﬂects the fact that all the consumers born during the last unit of
timewithvaluationsp < v < pE arestillinthemarketandwillbuyatpricep. Theequilibrium
condition ￿(p) ￿ ￿(pE) can therefore be written as
0 ￿ (p ￿ pE)
￿
E[min(￿;1)](1 ￿ pE) ￿ p
￿
:
This condition holds (indeed, holds as strict inequality) for all 0 < p < pE if and only if
E[min(￿;1)](1 ￿ pE) ￿ pE ￿ 0:
By (17), this inequality is equivalent to
pE ￿
1
1 + ￿
1￿e￿￿
: (18)
In particular, an equilibrium price is necessarily lower than the monopoly price pM = 1
2.
Consider now a seller who increases his price, to some p > pE. Only customers born after
the last seller’s visit may have valuations higher than p, which means that the seller’s proﬁt
￿(p) cannot be greater than ￿M(p). As ￿M is the quadratic function (2), ￿M(p) < ￿M(pE) if
p > 1 ￿ pE. Therefore, we only need to consider prices p ￿ 1 ￿ pE.
The proﬁt ￿(p) may actually be less than ￿M(p). This is because for some potential cus-
tomers it may be better to wait to the next seller, who will sell at price pE. The payoff this
alternative yields depends on the waiting time ￿ to the next seller, and in particular, for a
consumer of age x, on whether x + ￿ ￿ 1. Speciﬁcally, waiting is not an optimal option for
the consumer if and only if his valuation v satisﬁes
v ￿ p > E[e￿￿￿1x+￿￿1](v ￿ pE);
or
v > pE +
p ￿ pE
1 ￿ E[e￿￿￿ 1￿￿1￿x]
:
The probability that such a consumer is still in the market (because he did not have a chance
to buy at price pE) is e￿￿x. Therefore, the expected proﬁt from setting price p is
￿(p) = p
Z 1
0
max
￿
1 ￿ pE ￿
p ￿ pE
1 ￿ E[e￿￿￿ 1￿￿1￿x]
;0
￿
e￿￿xdx: (19)
If p is sufﬁciently close to pE to make
1 ￿ pE ￿
p ￿ pE
1 ￿ E[1￿￿1]
￿ 0; (20)
then by (17) and (19)
￿(p) ￿ ￿(pE) = p
Z 1
0
￿
1 ￿ pE ￿
p ￿ pE
1 ￿ E[e￿￿￿ 1￿￿1￿x]
￿
e￿￿xdx ￿ pE
Z 1
0
(1 ￿ pE)e￿￿x dx
= (p ￿ pE)
Z 1
0
￿
1 ￿ pE ￿
p
1 ￿ E[e￿￿￿ 1￿￿1￿x]
￿
e￿￿xdx:
20Anecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionforthisdifferencetobenonpositiveforallp > pE satisfying
(20) (which moreover implies that the difference is in fact negative) is that the integral on the
right-hand side is nonpositive for p = pE. This is so if and only if
pE ￿
1
1 + ￿
1￿e￿￿
R 1
0
e￿￿x
1￿E[e￿￿￿ 1￿￿1￿x]dx
: (21)
This inequality is consistent with the previous condition (18) if and only if the discount rate
￿ satisﬁes Z 1
0
e￿￿x
1 ￿ E[e￿￿￿ 1￿￿1￿x]
dx ￿ 1: (22)
The integral depends on ￿ as a strictly decreasing function. This is because the denominator
is strictly increasing, and tends to 1 or e￿￿(1￿x) when ￿ tends to 1 or 0, respectively. At the
ﬁrst limit, (22) does not hold, and at the second limit, it holds as strict inequality, because
Z 1
0
e￿￿x
e￿￿(1￿x)dx =
e￿ ￿ e￿￿
2￿
> 1:
Therefore, for any discount rate above the threshold deﬁned by equality in (22), an equi-
librium where all sellers set the same equilibrium price does not exist. For discount rates
sufﬁciently far below the threshold, there are many equilibria. In fact, as we show below, any
1
1 + 1
2
e￿￿e￿￿
1￿e￿￿
< pE ￿
1
1 + ￿
1￿e￿￿
is an equilibrium price for sufﬁciently low discount rate.
Fix any such price pE. As shown above, a seller would decrease his proﬁt by deviating to
any price p that is lower than pE or higher than 1 ￿ pE, and the same holds for all p satisfying
(20) if the discount rate ￿ is low enough to give (21). Consider then a price
pE + e￿￿(1 ￿ pE) ￿ p ￿ 1 ￿ pE; (23)
and let x0 be the unique point in [0;1] satisfying
e￿(1￿x0)(p ￿ pE) = 1 ￿ pE:
As Equation (19) shows, a seller’s proﬁt from setting the price p is determined by ￿ as a non-
decreasing function, which in the limit ￿ ! 0 becomes
p
Z 1
x0
￿
1 ￿ pE ￿ e￿(1￿x)(p ￿ pE)
￿
e￿￿xdx =
e￿￿
2￿
p
￿
p + pE ￿ 2 +
￿
2(1 ￿ pE) ￿ e￿(1￿x0)(p ￿ pE)
￿
e￿(1￿x0)
￿
=
e￿￿
2￿
p
￿
p + pE ￿ 2 + (1 ￿ pE)
1 ￿ pE
p ￿ pE
￿
=
e￿￿
2￿
p(1 ￿ p)2
p ￿ pE :
The last expression is determined by p as a strictly decreasing function in the interval speci-
ﬁedby(23),anditthereforeattainsitsmaximumattheleftendpoint. Atthatpoint,inequality
(20) holds (as equality, and x0 = 0), which as indicated implies that ￿(p) < ￿(pE) if ￿ is sufﬁ-
ciently close to 0. It therefore follows from the joint continuity of the expression in (19) in p
and ￿ that, for sufﬁciently low ￿, the same inequality holds simultaneously for all p satisfying
(23).
21B.2 Example 2
First case: declining valuations.
The monopoly proﬁt function in this case is given by
￿M(p) =
1
2
p(1 ￿ p) +
1
2
pmin(s;1 ￿ p);
as a seller is equally likely to be ﬁrst or second. The maximum point of this function, which
is the monopoly price pM, is given by
pM =
8
<
:
1+s
2 0 < s ￿ 1
3
1 ￿ s 1
3 ￿ s ￿ 1
2
1
2 s ￿ 1
2
(24)
(see Figure 3). By Theorem 1, in any equilibrium with a single equilibrium price, that price is
pM. To check whether such an equilibrium actually exists, suppose that both sellers set the
price to pM but one of them contemplates setting a different price p.
If p > pM ￿s, then the seller’s proﬁt from setting this price will not be greater than ￿M(p),
as consumers who already had a chance to buy the good at the lower price pM but chose
not to do so will also not buy now at price p. Therefore, the proﬁt from setting price p will
be less than ￿M(pM), the (monopoly) proﬁt from selling at price pM. If 0 < p ￿ pM ￿ s
(which by (24) is possible only if s < 1
2), then the proﬁt will be 1
2p(1 ￿ p) + 1
2p(pM ￿ p).
This is because, if the seller is the second one, some consumers who did not buy from the
ﬁrst seller at price pM, namely, those older than 1 ￿ pM + s but younger than 1 ￿ p, will
buy at price p. If 1
3 ￿ s < 1
2, then by (24) pM = 1 ￿ s, and therefore ￿M(pM) = s(1 ￿ s),
whereas maxp
￿1
2p(1 ￿ p) + 1
2p(pM ￿ p)
￿
= 1
16 (2 ￿ s)
2 ￿ 1
16
￿
2 ￿ 1
3
￿2 < 1
3
￿
1 ￿ 1
3
￿
￿ s(1 ￿ s).
This proves that pM is indeed an equilibrium price if s ￿ 1
3. If s < 1
3, then pM = 1+s
2 , and
therefore ￿M(pM) = 1
8 (1 + s)
2 and maxp
￿1
2p(1 ￿ p) + 1
2p(pM ￿ p)
￿
= 1
64 (3 + s)
2. The maxi-
mum is greater than 1
8 (1 + s)
2 if and only if s < 1
5+
p
32, and for such s, the maximum point p
satisﬁes p = 3+s
8 < 1￿s
2 = pM ￿ s. Therefore, pM is not an equilibrium price if s < 1
5+
p
32, but
it is so if s ￿ 1
5+
p
32.
Second case: time discounting.
If both sellers set the same price pE, their expected proﬁt is
￿(pE) =
1 + s
2
pE(1 ￿ pE):
A unilateral change of price to p < pE changes the seller’s proﬁt to
￿(p) =
1 + s
2
p (1 ￿ pE) + p (pE ￿ p);
where the second term reﬂects the fact that all consumers born during the last unit of time
with valuations p < v < pE are still in the market. The difference
￿(p) ￿ ￿(pE) = (p ￿ pE)
￿
1 + s
2
(1 ￿ pE) ￿ p
￿
is nonpositive for all 0 < p < pE if and only if
pE ￿
1
2 + 1￿s
1+s
: (25)
22Therefore, this inequality presents an upper bound to any equilibrium price, which is less
than the monopoly price pM = 1
2. In the following, we assume that (25) holds.
If a seller changes his price to p > pE, the proﬁt changes to
￿(p) =
1 + s
2
p (1 ￿ p) ￿
1 ￿ s
2
p min(
p ￿ pE
e￿s ￿ 1
;1 ￿ p): (26)
The second term represents the loss of consumers to the other seller, which is computed as
follows. If the seller charging p arrives ﬁrst, some of the consumers younger than 1 ￿ s will
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to wait and buy from the next seller, even though their valuation satisﬁes
v > p. Speciﬁcally, these are the young consumers for whom
0 < v ￿ p < e￿￿s(v ￿ pE);
or
p < v < p +
p ￿ pE
e￿s ￿ 1
:
This gives (26). By that equation,
￿(p)￿￿(pE) = max
￿
(p ￿ pE)
￿
1 + s
2
(1 ￿ pE ￿ p) ￿
1 ￿ s
2
p
e￿s ￿ 1
￿
;s p (1 ￿ p) ￿
1 + s
2
pE(1 ￿ pE)
￿
:
Therefore, the payoff difference is nonpositive for all p > pE if and only if this is so for both
the ﬁrst and second expression on the right-hand side. The ﬁrst condition holds if and only
if
1 + s
2
(1 ￿ pE ￿ pE) ￿
1 ￿ s
2
pE
e￿s ￿ 1
￿ 0;
that is,
pE ￿
1
2 + 1￿s
1+s
1
e￿s￿1
; (27)
and the second condition holds if and only if
pE ￿
1 ￿
q
1￿s
1+s
2
:
Therefore, pEis an equilibrium price if and only if it solves both inequalities as well as (25). It
is not difﬁcult to check that the set (speciﬁcally, interval) of all such solutions is nonempty if
and only if e￿￿s ￿ 1
2.
B.3 Example 3
Consider a generalized version of the example where the probability that the second seller
arrives is 0 < ￿ < 1. We prove below that there is a number 0 < s0(￿) < 1
8+
p
48 (￿ 0:067) such
that the following holds:
1. If 0 < s ￿ s0(￿), the unique equilibrium prices are p1 = 1￿￿
4￿3￿ (2 ￿ ￿ + 2￿s) for the ﬁrst
seller and p2 =
1￿￿(1+s)
4￿3￿ for the second seller, and p1 > p2.
2. If s ￿ 1
8+
p
48, the unique equilibrium prices are p1 = 1
2 and p2 = max(1 ￿ s; 1
2), so that
p1 ￿ p2.
3. If s0(￿) < s < 1
8+
p
48, no equilibrium exists.
23In Case 1, the equilibrium price p1 is lower than the ﬁrst seller’s monopoly price, which is
1
2,andp2 islowerthanthesecondseller’smonopolyprice,whichismax(1￿s; 1
2). Inparticular,
for ￿ = 1
2 and s < s0(1
2) = 1
26, the equilibrium prices satisfy p1 = 3
10 + 1
5s < 4
13 and p2 =
1
5 (1 ￿ s). The probability ￿ that the second seller will arrive determines the critical value
s0(￿) as a continuous and strictly decreasing function (see (34) below), which tends to 0 or
1
8+
p
48 as ￿ tends to 1 or 0; respectively.
To prove the assertions made in Cases 1–3, ﬁx the second seller’s price p2 and consider
the consumers’ reaction to any price 0 < p1 < 1 the ﬁrst seller may set. A consumer whose
valuation v of the good at time 0 exceeds p1 receives the payoff is v ￿ p1 if he buys it at that
time and the expected payoff max(￿(v ￿ p2 ￿ s);0) if he chooses to wait. The ﬁrst option is
better if and only if v exceeds the critical value vc given by
vc = max
￿
p1 ￿ ￿(p2 + s)
1 ￿ ￿
;p1
￿
= p1 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
max(p1 ￿ p2 ￿ s;0): (28)
Therefore, if p1 ￿ p2 + s, all the consumers who would get positive payoff from buying at
time 0 do so. But if p1 > p2 + s, then the consumers with v < vc, who are the ones older than
1￿p1￿￿(1￿p2￿s)
1￿￿ , do not buy. We conclude that the ﬁrst seller’s proﬁt ￿1 depends on the price
p1 he sets as follows:
￿1(p1) =
8
<
:
p1(1 ￿ p1) p1 ￿ p2 + s
p1
1￿p1￿￿(1￿p2￿s)
1￿￿ p2 + s < p1 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p2 ￿ s)
0 p1 > 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p2 ￿ s)
: (29)
Therefore, price p1 is proﬁt-maximizing if and only if
p1 =
8
<
:
1￿￿
2 + ￿
2 (p2 + s) p2 + s ￿ 1￿￿
2￿￿
p2 + s 1￿￿
2￿￿ ￿ p2 + s ￿ 1
2
1
2 p2 + s ￿ 1
2
: (30)
Plugging this into (28) gives vc < 1.
If s ￿ 1
2 (which falls in Case 2), then (30) and give p1 = vc = 1
2 regardless of p2, which
means that all the consumers younger than 1
2 buy the good from the ﬁrst seller. It follows
that the second seller’s price p2 is proﬁt-maximizing if and only if it is also 1
2. In the rest of
the proof, we assume that 0 < s < 1
2 and examine the optimally p2 by looking a the proﬁt the
second seller would make if he changed it unilaterally to any other price p.
One option is to sell only to young consumers, who were born after time 0, by setting a
price p ￿ 1 ￿ s (> 1
2, by assumption). The corresponding proﬁt is given by the expression
p(1 ￿ p), which attains its maximum of s(1￿s) at the unique maximum point p = 1￿s. The
alternative is to set a lower price that will appeal also to older consumers, who were born
before time 0 but did not buy the good then because their valuations were lower than the
threshold vc speciﬁed by (28). As the value of the good decreases linearly with time, selling to
such consumers requires setting a price 0 ￿ p ￿ vc ￿ s (< 1 ￿ s). The corresponding proﬁt,
which comes from selling to both young and old consumers, is p(vc ￿ p):The maximum of
this expression, which isattained at theunique maximumpointp = 1
2vc, is(1
2vc)2. Therefore,
if (1
2vc)2 > s(1￿s) (which is possible only if 1
2vc < vc ￿s), then p2 = 1
2vc is the second seller’s
unique proﬁt-maximizing price, and if (1
2vc)2 < s(1 ￿ s), then p2 = 1 ￿ s has this property.
If an equality holds, both prices, and only them, are proﬁt-maximizing. In the following, we
examine these conditions more closely.
Suppose ﬁrst that p2 > 1
2 ￿ s. By (30) and (28), p1 = vc = 1
2, so that (1
2vc)2 ￿ s(1 ￿ s) if
and only if s ￿ 1
8+
p
48 (￿ 0:067). This proves that, for 1
8+
p
48 ￿s < 1
2, the prices p2 = 1 ￿ s
and p1 = 1
2 are equilibrium prices. There are no other equilibrium prices with p2 > 1
2 ￿ s for
any 0 < s < 1
2, because p2 = 1
2vc = 1
4 could be so only if s were less than 0:067, which would
contradict the assumption p2 > 1
2 ￿ s.
24Suppose now that p2 ￿ 1
2 ￿ s. By (30),
p1 ￿ p2 ￿ s =
1 ￿ ￿
2
￿
2 ￿ ￿
2
min
￿
p2 + s;
1 ￿ ￿
2 ￿ ￿
￿
￿ 0; (31)
and therefore vc =
p1￿￿(p2+s)
1￿￿ . As shows, p2 (which is less than 1￿s) is an equilibrium price if
and only if p2 = 1
2vc and
p2
2 ￿ s(1 ￿ s): (32)
The ﬁrst condition, which is equivalent to
p2 =
p1 ￿ ￿s
2 ￿ ￿
; (33)
and (31) together imply p1 > p2 ￿ s. If 1￿￿
2￿￿ ￿ p2 + s ￿ 1
2, their unique solution is p1 = 2s and
p2 = s (< 1
2), which does not satisfy (32). If p2 + s < 1￿￿
2￿￿, the solution is
p1 =
1 ￿ ￿
4 ￿ 3￿
(2 ￿ ￿ + 2￿s)
p2 =
1 ￿ ￿(1 + s)
4 ￿ 3￿
( <
1
4
):
These prices satisfy (32) and the inequality p2 + s < 1￿￿
2￿￿ if and only if s ￿ s0 (￿), where
s0 (￿) =
2(1 ￿ ￿)
2
(8 ￿ 7￿)(2 ￿ ￿) + (4 ￿ 3￿)
p
￿2 + 12(1 ￿ ￿)
; (34)
and in this case, they are the unique equilibrium prices. By (29), the ﬁrst seller’s equilibrium
proﬁt is p1
1￿p1￿￿(1￿p2￿s)
1￿￿ , which equals p1 (1 ￿ p2);and the second seller’s proﬁt is p2
2. For
s > s0 (￿);there are no equilibrium prices with p2 + s ￿ 1
2.
B.4 Example 4
The parameters of this example are similar to the generalized version of Example 3, except
that the second seller arrives with probably 1
2￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and 1
8+
p
48 ￿s ￿ 1
10. The second pair of
inequalities is equivalent to 1
4 ￿
p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿ 3
10.
For any ￿s + (2 ￿ ￿)
p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿ p￿ ￿ 1
2, we show that there is an equilibrium in which
theﬁrstsellersellsatpricep￿. Forexample,ifthesecondsellerarriveswithprobability￿ = 1
2,
andhedoessos = 4
53 (￿ 0:075)unitsoftimeaftertheﬁrstseller,thenforeverypricebetween
23
53 and 1
2 there is an equilibrium in which the ﬁrst seller sets this price. If the second seller
arrives with certainty 1
10 units of time after the ﬁrst seller, then every price between 2
5 and 1
2
is an equilibrium price for the ﬁrst seller.
The consumers’ equilibrium strategy speciﬁes that a consumer buys from the second
seller at any price lower than his valuation (at time s), but buys from the ﬁrst seller at a re-
quested price 0 ￿ p ￿ 1 if and only if his age (at time 0) is less than xp, where
xp =
8
<
:
1 ￿ p p ￿ p￿
1 ￿ 2
2￿￿ (p ￿ ￿s) p￿ < p < 1 ￿ ￿
￿1
2 ￿ s
￿
0 p ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿1
2 ￿ s
￿ : (35)
Inotherwords,ifp ￿ p￿,aconsumerbuysthegoodfromtheﬁrstsellerifandonlyifhevalues
it at more than p, but if p > p￿; he buys if and only if the value to him exceeds 2
2￿￿ (p ￿ ￿s).
25The second threshold is higher than p, because for p > p￿ (￿ ￿s + (2 ￿ ￿)
p
s(1 ￿ s)),
2
2 ￿ ￿
(p ￿ ￿s) ￿ p >
2
2 ￿ ￿
(p￿ ￿ ￿s) ￿ p￿ (36)
=
￿
2 ￿ ￿
(p￿ ￿ 2s)
￿
￿
2 ￿ ￿
￿
￿s + (2 ￿ ￿)
p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿ 2s
￿
= ￿
￿p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿ s
￿
> 0:
The second seller’s price p2 is determined as follows. If the price p set by the ﬁrst seller
is such that 1 ￿ xp ￿ 2
p
s(1 ￿ s), then p2 = 1 ￿ s, which yields the proﬁt s(1 ￿ s). Only
consumers who were not yet born at time 0 buy at that price. Selling also to those who were
thenolderthanxp,andforthisreasondidnotbuyfromtheﬁrstseller,wouldrequiresettinga
pricep2 ￿ 1￿xp￿s,forwhichtheproﬁtwouldbep2 (1 ￿ p2 ￿ xp). However,p2 (1 ￿ p2 ￿ xp) ￿
1
4 (1 ￿ xp)
2 ￿ s(1 ￿ s) for any p2. If 1 ￿ xp > 2
p
s(1 ￿ s), then p2 =
1￿xp
2 (< 1 ￿ xp ￿ s,
as 1 ￿ xp > 2s), and the corresponding proﬁt is p2 (1 ￿ p2 ￿ xp) = 1
4 (1 ￿ xp)
2 (> s(1 ￿ s)).
Therefore, by (35) and the assumption 1
4 ￿
p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿ 3
10: (i) if p ￿ p￿ (￿ 1
2), then 1 ￿ xp =
p ￿ 1
2 ￿ 2
p
s(1 ￿ s) and p2 = 1 ￿ s, and (ii) if p > p￿ (￿ ￿s + (2 ￿ ￿)
p
s(1 ￿ s)), then
1 ￿ xp = min
￿
2
2￿￿ (p ￿ ￿s);1
￿
> 2
p
s(1 ￿ s) and
p2 =
1 ￿ xp
2
= min
￿
p ￿ ￿s
2 ￿ ￿
;
1
2
￿
: (37)
In case (i), p ￿ p￿ < p2, and so it is optimal for consumers who value the good at more
than p at time 0 to buy it at that price, as their strategy instructs them to do. In case (ii),
buying the good at time 0 (at price p) is optimal for a consumer of age x < 1 ￿ p if and only if
1￿x￿p ￿ ￿(1 ￿ x ￿ p2 ￿ s), or (1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ 1￿p￿￿(1 ￿ p2 ￿ s), and waiting for the second
seller is optimal if and only if the reverse inequality holds. By (37),
1 ￿ p ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p2 ￿ s) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿
2
2 ￿ ￿
(p ￿ ￿s)
￿
; (38)
with equality if xp > 0. Thus, if p > p￿ and xp > 0, the consumers’ strategy (35) prescribes
optimal actions for them. The same holds if xp = 0, or p ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿1
2 ￿ s
￿
, as this inequality
means that the right-hand side of (38) is nonpositive, and hence not buying the good at time
0 is an optimal action for all consumers.
It remains to show that the given p￿ is the proﬁt-maximizing price for the ﬁrst seller. If
the seller sets a price 0 < p ￿ p￿, his proﬁt will be p(1 ￿ p), which is less than or equal to
p￿ (1 ￿ p￿),asp￿ ￿ 1
2. By(35),theproﬁtforanypricep > p￿ isthemaximumofp
￿
1 ￿ 2
2￿￿ (p ￿ ￿s)
￿
and zero. The former depends on p as a quadratic, concave function, with a maximum at
1
2 ￿ ￿
2
￿1
2 ￿ s
￿
. This maximum point lies to the left of p￿, as
p￿ ￿
￿
1
2
￿
￿
2
￿
1
2
￿ s
￿￿
￿ ￿s + (2 ￿ ￿)
p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿
￿
1
2
￿
￿
2
￿
1
2
￿ s
￿￿
= (2 ￿ ￿)
￿p
s(1 ￿ s) ￿
1
4
￿
+
1
2
￿s
> 0:
Therefore, for any price p > p￿, p
￿
1 ￿ 2
2￿￿ (p ￿ ￿s)
￿
￿ p￿
￿
1 ￿ 2
2￿￿ (p￿ ￿ ￿s)
￿
￿ p￿ (1 ￿ p￿),
where the last inequality follows from (36). Thus, no such price gives the ﬁrst seller a higher
proﬁt than p￿ does.
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